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Despite much talk about economic globalization and the oft-quoted spectacular post-World-
War-II growth in trade ﬂows, world trade at any point in time covers a surprisingly small
part of the world. In 1950, almost 52 percent of the potential number of bilateral trading
relationships did not report any manufacturing trade at all. By 1997 the potential number
of bilateral trading relationship had increased by more than 500 percent, but the share of
bilateral trading relationships that were actually utilized was still no more than 58 percent.1
Globalization thus evolves along two major margins. At the intensive margin, established
bilateral trading relationships change their trade volume, while at the extensive margin new
trading relationships are established, or existing ones abandoned, partly based on the forma-
tion of new countries.
It is somewhat surprising that this two-fold margin has so far not been systematically
explored in empirical studies of international trade. In particular, it has received little or no
attention in applications of the gravity-based approach that for various reasons has recently
experienced a remarkable revival. One ﬁnds occasional reference to the large and time-varying
number of zero entries in bilateral trade matrices,2 but a systematic treatment of the issue
is still missing. The usual approach is to restrict attention to those country pairs for which
strictly positive trade ﬂows are observed. This seems inadequate for two reasons. First, the
aforementioned numbers strongly suggest that in doing so one ignores an important part
of the “action” across time. And secondly, given the coexistence of the two margins, the
exact interpretation of estimates obtained with this procedure is quesitonable, as are their
statistical properties.
In this paper, we provide descriptive evidence on the quantitative importance of the
extensive and the intensive margin in the growth of world trade since World-War-II. In doing
1These numbers are from a data set to be described in detail below.
2See, for instance, Evenett & Venables (2002) who employ an ad-hoc model to explain the expansion of
a country’s exports of disaggregated commodities into new markets. A further case in point is Haveman &
Hummels (2004) whose imperfect-specialization-based foundation of the gravity equation is motivated by its
better consistency with the large number of zero entries in bilateral trade matrices. Note that, while these
studies focus on disaggregate trade where zero entries seem more likely, the above-mentioned numbers refer
to aggregate manufacturing trade.
1so, we carefully separate two forms in which the extensive margin arises: it may be due to
the formation of new countries, or may arise in the form of trade being taken up for the ﬁrst
time between pre-existing countries where the trading relationship was previously dormant.
We also look at the amount of trade generated by newly established trading relationships.
Our analysis reveals the extent to which the two margins have shaped the enormous growth
of world trade in various episodes between 1950 and 1997.
We then move on to a simple theoretical formulation of the gravity equation which takes
explicit account of the aforementioned “dual margin” of world trade. In doing so, we empha-
size the role of distance-related transportation cost. This is motivated by what has sometimes
been called the “distance-puzzle”, i.e., econometric evidence suggesting that in the context
of the gravity model the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance has increased
over time. Such evidence has recently been emphasized by Brun et al. (2004) and Coe et
al. (2002), corroborating earlier evidence presented by Frankel (1997).3 Leamer & Levinsohn
(1995) were the ﬁrst to draw attention to this trend, concluding that, contrary to popular
notions of globalization, the world is not “getting smaller”. They argue, in line with the
gravity approach, that the driving force behind globalization is not lower distance-barriers,
but increased dispersion of economic mass around the globe. More recently, Buch et al.
(2004) argue against the notion of a distance-puzzle in that globalization may work as much
through aﬀecting the intercept of the gravity equation, as through a change in the estimated
distance-elasticity. However, the ﬁnding that today distance apparently restricts bilateral
trade more than in earlier periods still constitutes a puzzle, since it suggests that, other
things equal, distance-related trade barriers have become more important. This is diﬃcult to
reconcile with the undisputed fact that the past 5 decades have witnessed enormous progress
in transport and communication which should reduce, rather than increase, the trade-barrier
eﬀect of distance.4
There is, thus, still a puzzle to be resolved. Indeed, we interpret this puzzle as a clear
indication of an empirical failure of the conventional gravity approach. There may be several
3It is interesting and important to note that distance appears to have lost its trade-restrictive power, not
only over the recent decades, but also over a longer centenary horizon; see Irwin & Terviö (2002).
4See, however, Hummels (1999) who qualiﬁes this view by direct evidence on transport costs.
2routes of remedy that seem promising and worth pursuing. We argue that an adequate
treatment of both the extensive and the intensive margins of world trade is one of them.
Following Wooldridge (2002), we present a general model where zero-bilateral trade arises as
a “corner-solution” in an environment of gravity-type forces on trade. The basic assumption
is that both margins are governed by the same underlying determinants. Our estimation
equation involves a latent variable and a rudimentary modeling of the transport sector. We
provide an in-depth discussion of the econometric issues raised by such a model. We show
that both, the usual linear estimator as well as the non-linear least squares estimator imply a
mis-speciﬁcation that shows up in the form the distance-puzzle. More importantly, however,
the conventional approach does not disentangle the extensive and the intensive margins of
world trade. Based on our corner-solutions gravity model, we achieve such a disentangling by
means of a Tobit estimation approach. A key result of our analysis is that the distance-puzzle
does, indeed, disappear. Incorporating the extensive margin of world trade thus constitutes
a clear improvement of the gravity approach.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 ﬁrst discusses the methodological problem
underlying the so-called distance-puzzle and gives intuitive reasons why an extension of theory
towards a consistent treatment of the “dual margin” of world trade should , a-priori, be
expected to form an important part of the solution. Section 3 describes our trade data and
then provides an in-depth dissection of world trade growth from 1950 to 1997, documenting
the relative importance of the extensive and the intensive margins of globalization. Section
4 introduces the corner-solutions gravity model and discusses the relevant econometric issues
leading to the TOBIT approach. Section 5 presents the data set used, followed by a discussion
of the regression results. Section 6 concludes the paper by a summary of our results and their
implications for future research.
2 A methodological view on the distance-puzzle
Fundamentally, the so-called distance-puzzle is simply a reﬂection of “missing trade”, “or
missing globalization”. In other words, observed trade through time increasingly falls short
of what estimates of the gravity model would predict, based on the evolution of time-varying
determinants of trade. If the model is deemed correct regardless, then this shows up as an
3increasing estimated importance of the time-invariant inhibiting force of distance. What
makes this a “puzzle” is that it is grossly at odds with the widely held view, and lots of direct
evidence, that advancements in transport and communication should have made distance a
less important barrier through time. If we accept this as a valid a-priori conviction, then the
simple verdict is that the theory performs badly, and increasingly so over time. The appropri-
ate response, therefore, is trying to improve the theory, ﬁnding the “missing factors” reﬂected
in seemingly “missing trade”. Any reformulation of the theory that takes the explanatory
burden from “missing trade” oﬀ the distance variable would be seen as an improvement in
the theoretical speciﬁcation of the model.5
Why, then, should we expect the “dual margin” of trade to play an important role in this
attempt? The intuition is quite simple and runs as follows. If trade is the result of mass
attraction and resistance from geographical distance, as suggested by gravity theory, and if
attraction in some cases is not strong enough to generate trade at all, then ignoring all such
cases implies that we systematically overestimate the force of attraction, or — equivalently —
underestimate the trade-inhibiting force of distance. Now suppose that the prevalence of such
zero-trade cases falls through time, say because of technological improvements in transport
and communication. Then, the overestimation bias in the force of attraction also falls through
time. However, if we take the estimated force of attraction on face value, the result is that an
ever increasing volume of seemingly “missing trade” gets shouldered onto the time-invariant
distance-variable.
There are, of course, other deﬁciencies of the model that might play a role. A quick
explanation that is often brought up in connection with the distance puzzle relates to trade
liberalization. If distance is large, then tariﬀs are a relatively small part of overall trade costs.
If tariﬀs are equal for all trading relationships to start with, and if they are reduced by an equal
(absolute) amount for all trading relationships, then — other things equal — the percentage
reduction in the destination price will be larger for low-distance trading relationships. Tariﬀ
liberalization will then have a disproportionally large impact on short-distance trade. In the
gravity model, this eﬀect might be picked up by an increasing role of distance as a trade-
5See Treﬂer (1995) who similarly notes “missing trade” as an important apparent deﬁcieny of the Heckscher-
Ohlin trade model.
4inhibiting factor through time. However, this route of explanation importantly hinges on an
equal level of tariﬀs to start with, and on an equal amount of tariﬀ liberalization across all
trading relationships, which seems questionable.
One might also look for foreign direct investment (FDI) as a potential explanation for
the distance-puzzle. The enormous increase in FDI as such, however, is not enough. First,
the relationship between trade and FDI is far from clear-cut, even qualitatively. If they are
substitutes, then an explanation of the puzzlew o u l dr e q u i r et h a tF D Ih a ss y s t e m a t i c a l l y
replaced long distance trade more than short distance-trade. While distance and trade costs
no doubt play a role for FDI, particularly through the well-known proximity-concentration
trade oﬀ, it is not at all clear why FDI and subsequent host-country sales, instead of exports,
should be more attractive for long-distance markets. Theory tells that market-size and mon-
itoring costs play a role as well. Moreover, FDI may be used as a platform to serve other
markets, in which case it is complementary to trade. Empirically, distance appears to play
an ambiguous role for FDI, which would cast additional doubt on whether it is a promising
route to follow for solving the distance-puzzle for trade.6
Overall, our priors are that the distance-puzzle establishes a convincing case for exploring
the dual margin in world trade, and to extend the gravity model in such a way that it
consistently captures simultaneous movements on both margins through time. We thus move
on to a detailed empirical account of such movements, followed by a reformulation of the
gravity equation, including a discussion of the econometric issues arising from the dual margin,
and empirical estimation based on panel data, and using a Tobit estimation approach.
3 Dissecting the dual margin of world trade
Expansion of world trade evolves at two margins. At the extensive margin new trading
relationships between countries are opened up, or existing relationships are closed, while
at the intensive margin the level of trade based on existing relationships is increased or
reduced. In empirical studies of bilateral world trade this is reﬂected by a large and time-
6The role of distance for FDI has been examined, for instance, by Markusen (2002, ch.10) and by Egger &
Pfaﬀermayr (2004), with ambiguous results.
5varying number of zero-entries in trade matrices, and by unbalanced panels. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no systematic account of the role that these two margins have
played in the growth of overall world trade after World-War-II. Moreover, as we argue below,
the coexistence of the two margins has not been adequately dealt with by the econometric
techniques employed in estimating gravity equations on world trade. In this section we shed
light on the empirical relevance of the issue by dissecting the growth of world trade along the
lines of the aforementioned two margins.
3.1 Data issues
We start oﬀ with a few data issues. Empirical studies based on the gravity approach use
dyadic observations on trade, whereby the unit of observation is a country pair. Any empir-
ical investigation of the dual margin must rely on observations of dormant trading relation-
ships. However, the data sources for dyadic trade often do not include such observations, but
simply treat any country pair for which there is no reported trade during a given year as a
missing observation. This may be a prime motivation for restricting empirical applications
of the gravity approach to observations where bilateral trade ﬂows are strictly positive. We
have argued above that this is problematic as it ignores a lot of action over time. However,
replacing missing values by zeros may be no less problematic, unless the data source pro-
vides information on whether the respective observations are genuinely missing or have been
explicitly reported was zero.
In this paper, we rely on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DoTS) which does not pro-
vide such information. However, upon extensive scrutiny of the DoTS, Gleditsch (2002) con-
cludes that 80% of all observations coded as missing do in fact represent zeros. He reaches
this conclusion after a careful comparison of the DoTS with other data bases, such as the
COMTRADE basis of the UN, data from the WTO or national accounts. Hence, we feel
comfortable enough in assuming zero trade for all missing observations in the IMF DoTS.
Coe et al. (2002) and Santos and Tenreyro (2004) adopt the same strategy.
Dyadic trade data typically pose a further data problem in that information provided
by exporting countries often does not ﬁt the data released by importing countries; see for
instance Rozanski and Yeats (1994). However, international organizations have set up a
6number of task forces to harmonize national standards and deﬁnitions7, so that one should
expect data quality to have improved over time. Moreover, while published data certainly
remains prone to measurement errors, whether or not a country pair was trading at a certain
point in time does not depend on standards or deﬁnitions and should — in principle at least
— be easy to verify, since any transaction is always recorded twice, once in the exporting
country, and then again in the importing country.
There is a presumption that import data are more reliable than export data, since most
governments closely track imports which constitute a tax base, while no comparable incentive
exists on the export side. This is reﬂected by the fact that the number of country pairs report-
ing positive trade is larger if based on import data than if based on exports. Better reliability
has prompted some researchers to construct dyadic trade data from imports alone; see Coe
et a. (2002) and Brun et al. (2004). This strategy, however, has an important shortcoming
itself. Import ﬂows are typically evaluated c.i.f., including in particular costs of transport and
insurance. Using such data in a regression of bilateral trade on some proxy of transportation
costs (distance, say) yields an inconsistent estimator for the distance-coeﬃcient, as distance
will, almost by deﬁnition, be correlated with the error term. Using more error-prone export
data most likely results in a lower eﬃciency of the estimation procedure, but yields consistent
estimates, since f.o.b. evaluation as such preserves standard regularity assumptions on the
error term. Faced with the choice between eﬃciency and consistency, researchers often opt
for consistency. In this paper, we follow Rose (2004) in using an average of c.i.f. import- and
f.o.b. export-values, in order to obtain a maximum number of observations.8 Extensive checks
have revealed that using f.o.b. data alone, while reducing the number of observations, does
not aﬀect the core results. In the sequel, the variable Tij is deﬁned as bilateral trade between
country i and j,d e ﬁned as the sum of recorded exports plus imports by the two countries
(whence each trade ﬂow is recorded four times) divided by 4.9 The data cover 1950-1997 and
are in constant US dollars, based on the US CPI (1983=100).
7See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ for details.
8Indeed, we use those same data which have generously been made available by Andy Rose on his website.
See http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm. Choosing a sample period from 1950 to 1997
avoids incomplete recordings at the beginning and towards the end.
9Where only 3 (or 2) observations on bilateral trade are available, their sum is divided by 3 (or 2).
73.2 The vintage of trading relationships
We deﬁne the “vintage” of a trading relationship as the earliest time at which trade may
occur between any pair of two countries, based on a) their independent existence and b)
their principal openness. A country is judged open if it reports trade with at least one other
country. Of course, an open country need not trade will all other open economies. We denote
the number of active trading relationships of vintage h by Nt,h. This will typically be lower
than the number of potential vintage-h trading relationships at time t, which is denoted by















where ¯ Tt,h is the average trade volume based on trading relationships of vintage h,a n d¯ Tt






Moreover, Vt denotes the overall number of potential trading relationships, Vt ≡
Pt
h=t0 Vt,h,
and t0 denotes the “beginning of time”. In the second line, nt,h is deﬁned as the share of
active trading relationships within vintage h,a n dζt,h is deﬁned as the share of vintage h in
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a movement of world trade on the intensive margin, whence pre-existing relationships vary




(Nt,h − Nt−1,h)+nt,t∆Vt = ∆Nx,t + nt,tVt,t (4)
are called movements on the extensive margin of world trade, where ∆Vt ≡ Vt − Vt−1 is the
change in the number of potential trading relationships due to the formation of new countries,
or disappearance of old ones. If no old countries disappear, then ∆Vt ≡ Vt,t,a sa s s u m e di n
the above equation.
Equation (4) separates two types of extensive margins. At the extensive margin proper,
8denoted by ∆Nx,t, the utilization of potential trading relationships between pre-existing coun-
tries and vintages h ≤ t−1 changes from t−1 to t. In terms of theory, this should obviously
be treated as endogenous. By way of contrast, ∆Vt which captures the ﬁrst-time emergence
of new trading partners, and disappearance of existing ones, is certainly an exogenous event,
at least for the gravity theory of trade. We therefore call ∆Vt the pseudo-extensive margin of
world trade. However, the extent to which new potential trading relationships, ∆Vt, become
active at once, i.e., the term nt,t, must be seen as endogenously determined according to the
gravity approach. This is exactly what the approach suggested below does.
Deﬁning Nt ≡
Pt
h=t0 nthζthVt, we may now decompose the growth in world trade accord-
i n gt o( 1 )a sf o l l o w s :
∆Tt = ∆¯ TtNt−1 + ∆Nt ¯ Tt = ∆¯ TtNt−1 +( ∆Nx,t + nt,t∆Vt) ¯ Tt, (5)
where all changes are from t − 1 to t,a n d∆Nt is taken from (4). Notice that with this
decomposition, changes on the extensive margin are weighted by end-of-period average trade
volumes, while changes on the intensive margin are weighted by beginning-of-period numbers
of trading relationships.
3.3 Empirics of the dual margin
Figures 1 through 3 provide a succinct but comprehensive overview of the role that these
margins have played in the post-World-War-II evolution of world trade in manufactures,
based on the data set described above. Figure 1.a highlights the extensive margin, looking at
the increasing utilization over time t of potential trading relationships for diﬀerent groups of
vintages. The leftmost horizontal line gives
P1950
h=t0 Vt,h,w h i l et h el i n eb e l o wg i v e s
P1950
h=t0 Nt,h
for t up to 1959. Note the diﬀerence between t0 (“beginning of time”) and the beginning
of the sample period which is 1950. The numbers are in natural logs. The corresponding




h=t0 Nt,h, respectively, and analogously
for vintages up to 1980 and 1993 further to the right. The jump in the horizontal lines
are exogenous movements on the pseudo-extensive margin, while the gap between the two
lines at any point in time reveals the extent to which potential trading relationships of the
respective groups of vintages have not yet become active. For instance, of the maximum
9number of trading relationships based on vintages up to 1950, about 40 percent had not yet
become active by 1950. By 1959, the number of active relationships has increased by about 20
percent, narrowing the gap of unutilized relationships to 30 percent. Including vintages 1950-
1960, we observe a 1960-jump in the maximum number of trading relationships by about 65
percent (relative to vintages up to 1950). Including these additional vintages, the number of
active relationships has increased by about 40 percent between 1959 and 1960, which implies
a larger gap of unutilized relationships equal to about 43 percent in 1960. Figure 1.a conveys
a simple and important message: There was signiﬁcant change at both types of extensive
margins, with the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the 1990s, showing stronger movements on the
extensive margin proper than the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, there is still much ground to

















1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
year
Note: flat lines indicate maximum (potential) number of trading relationships
Actual and potential number of trading pairs by 'country vintage'
Fig. 1.a: The extensive margin of world trade expansion 1950-1997
Figure 1.a deliberately ignores the volume of trade involved in movements at the extensive
margin. Figure 1.b brings ¯ Tt into the picture, revealing that the evolution of world trade
volume is heavily dominated by movements at the intensive margin. The bars indicate the




¯ Tt,hNt,h for H = 1950,1960,1980,1993, in line with ﬁgure 1.a. The
extent to which actual trade at any point t (on the horizontal axis) exceeds trade based
10on vintages h ≤ H<treveals the quantitative importance (judged by trading volumes)
of movements that have taken place between H and t on the extensive margin. In other
words, as opposed to ﬁgure 1.a, movements at the extensive margin are now weighted by
the relative amount of trade involved. Moreover, in ﬁgure 1.b we can no longer identify the
extensive margin proper, separately from the pseudo-extensive margin. For instance, by 1980
the volume of world trade had increased to about 12 times its 1950-level. The volume of trade
based on vintages only up to 1960, the increase vis à vis 1950 was only about 11-fold, the
remainder being due to vintages 1960-1980. While ﬁgure 1.b indicates that, judged by trade
volumes, the intensive margin is more important, it must be emphasized that the extensive
margin in and of itself, i.e., independent on the trade volume aﬀected, is a key explanatory
target of the gravity approach which has so far almost entirely been neglected. And ﬁgure














1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
year
vintages up to 1950 vintages up to 1960
vintages up to 1980 vintages up to 1993
total
Evolution of trade volumes by vintage
Fig. 1.b: The intensive and extensive margin of world trade expansion
Figure 2 dissects the overall growth in world trade from 1950 up to 1997. It asks a very
simple question: What is the contribution of vintages up to H towards the overall cumulative
growth in world trade between 1950 and 1997? The bars indicate the frequency distribution,












¯ T1950,hN1950,h on the left-hand vertical axis, with H going from 1950 to 1997 on the
11horizontal axis. Using the right-hand axis, the line depicts the growth rate for trade, again be-
















































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
vintage
vintage distribution cumulative growth by vintage
vintage distribution of cumulative growth rates
Fig. 2: Growth of world trade 1950-1997
To understand ﬁgure 2, it is perhaps helpful to look at extreme reference cases. For
instance, if all growth in world trade had happened entirely at the intensive margin, then
the distribution function would be degenerate, with the all “mass” concentrated at vintages
up to H = 1950. On the other hand, if all growth had been due in a completely symmetric
way to movements at the extensive margin, then we would have a linear increase of the
bars and a straight line for the growth rates. Moreover, vertical jumps at interior points
indicate movements at the extensive margin (proper plus pseudo), while ﬂat segments indicate
prevalence of the intensive margin. More speciﬁcally, based on vintages up to 1950 the growth
rate of world trade between 1950 and 1997 was about 1100 percent, contributing about 60
percent to cumulative growth during the entire sample period. Including vintages 1950-1960,
the growth rate increases to about 1420 percent, contributing a further 20 percent to overall
cumulative growth. The message conveyed is that the cumulative growth of trade from 1950
to 1997 involves both, episodes where the contribution was more important on the extensive
12margin (late 1950s and early 1960s, as well as the 1990s) and an interim period dominated






















1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
year
cum. intensive margin cum. extensive margin
cum. pseudo-ext. margin total
Cumulative difference from 1950, in thousand bio. real dollars
Fig. 3.a: Decomposing the evolution of world trade 1950-1997
Finally, ﬁgures 3 depicts a decomposition of world trade growth into its constituent parts
according to equation (5) above. Plotting t = 1959...1997 on the horizontal axis, ﬁgure
3.a reveals how the cumulative diﬀerence of actual trade from the initial volume for 1950,
indicated by bars, is decomposed into changes at the respective margins, indicated by lines.
More speciﬁcally the intensive margin line in ﬁgure 3.a depicts (¯ Tt − ¯ T1950)
P1950
h=t0 N1950,h,













.B y d e ﬁnition,
the three lines add up to the bars. Figure 3.b plots the yearly growth rates at these same
margins according to equation (5), dividing each component change by the actual volume of
world trade in the previous period. Again, the lines must add up to the bars, indicating yearly
changes in total world trade volumes. The ﬁrst and important impression we obtain from
ﬁgure 3.b is that growth rates do vary a lot across years, as does the relative importance of
the three constituent margins. Extreme values of overall yearly growth tend to be dominated
by movements at the intensive margin, the exception being the period from the late 1950s to
the late 1960s, as well as the early 1990s. But even for the 1970s and 1980s, the extensive
13margin did play a role, as evidenced by the diﬀerence between the bar-values and the solid
line. Quite clearly, however, the big dent in world trade occurring in the early 1980s was due






































1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
year
yearly intensive margin yearly extensive margin
yearly pseudo-ext. margin total world trade growth
Figure 3.b: Decomposing growth rates of world trade
When looking at ﬁgure 3.a, one needs to be aware of the fact that the contribution of
the extensive margins to the growth of trade from 1950 is weighted by the current average
trade volume ¯ Tt, while the contribution of the intensive margin receives base-period weights
from the 1950 number of active trading relationships, i.e.,
P1950
h=t0 N1950,h. Given the large
movements in average trading volumes, over time, the two extensive margins thus receive
large weights which may, at ﬁrst sight, cause a misleading impression of a dormant, rather
than dominant behavior of the intensive margin, as suggested by ﬁgure 3.b. However, once
the implication of weighting is realized, ﬁgure 3.b has a revealing interpretation. For instance,
from 1950 to 1980, world trade has increased by about 9.3 thousand bio (real 1983) dollars. If
all newly emerging trading relationships since 1950 that have become active by 1980 had been
trading on the average 1980 level, ¯ T1980, then this margin alone (pseudo-extensive margin)
would imply an increase by as much as about 6.5 thousand bio dollars. Taking the 1950-1980
increase in the number of active relationships only of vintages up to 1950 (extensive margin
proper), adds a further increase by 1.4 thousandb i od o l l a r s .A b o u tt h a ts a m ei n c r e a s ei so b -
14served on the intensive margin, assuming that the 1950 number of active trading relationships
had increased their trading volume according to ¯ T1980 − ¯ T1950.
4 Modelling the dual margin of globalization
Established trade theory does not go very far in explaining movements on the dual margin
of world trade. In a large class of models, the focus lies squarely on countries’ overall trade.
As noted recently by Deardorﬀ (2004), the comparisons are mostly “done globally”, and not
by pairs of countries, thus leaving bilateral trade undetermined. This seems justiﬁable on
the grounds that bilateral trade of a country is largely irrelevant for its level of welfare, but
in many respects bilateral trade is important. Obviously, such models are of little help in
explaining movements on the dual margin of world trade that we have identiﬁed above.
Common sense suggests that bilateral trade is importantly determined by natural barri-
ers to trade, particularly trade costs related to geographic distance and transport. Indeed,
the prime reason why traditional trade theory leaves bilateral trade undetermined is that
it has so far almost entirely neglected all such costs. The important exception, of course,
is the gravity approach where distance is usually added as a trade-inhibiting force, along-
side the “economic mass” of two countries as the key force generating bilateral trade. It
has been noted several times that something like this gravity force becomes apparent, when-
ever — and for whatever reason — trade is based on perfect specialization, meaning that each
good (with a suﬃciently narrow deﬁnition) is produced in only one country, but consumed
everywhere (say due to identical preferences). Such a case arises, almost by deﬁnition, in
a love-for-variety product diﬀerentiation framework with increasing returns to scale, which
is the usual theoretical justiﬁcation of the gravity equation going back to Anderson (1979).
With comparative-advantage-based trade, it arises if domestic trade is treated on an equal
footing with foreign trade, or if the number of goods and countries is very large, relative to
the number of factors; see Deardorﬀ (1998).10 The problem with the traditional approach
based on product diﬀerentiation is that it fails to explain zero bilateral trade, which is an
10Af u l l - ﬂedged incorporation of trade costs into a generalized theory of comparative advantage has recently
been provided by Deardorﬀ (2004).
15important characteristic of real world trade data, as emphasized above. Alternative theoret-
ical foundations of the gravity equation that do allow for zero trade have been provided by
Eaton & Kortum (2002), Feenstra et al. (2001) and Haveman & Hummels (2004).
In this section, we abstain from providing an explicit structural model of trade leading
to the gravity equation, but simply work with a general reduced form relationship which,
given the above mentioned literature, is consistent with a relatively broad range of models
permitting zero bilateral trade as an equilibrium outcome. Our primary aim is to add an
explicit, if rudimentary, treatment of the transport sector which helps us explore the role that
distance plays in a gravity equation, with an eye on the dual margin of world trade
4.1 A simple gravity framework
In order to capture the possibility of zero bilateral trade, we specify the gravity model as a
“corner-solutions-model”. Denoting the volume of bilateral trade between country i and j at
time t by Tijt,w ed e ﬁne a latent variable T∗
ijt which may take any value on the real line. Our
model implies that only if this latent variable exceeds some threshold variable ¯ Tijt, will the






· Π(Sijt) · F [C (Dij,Pt,t)], (6)
Tijt =m a x
¡
0,T∗
ijt − ¯ Tijt
¢
. (7)
In the remaining analysis, we allow for a constant term in (6) and set ¯ Tijt =0 . It should be
noted at the outset that in this framework globalization may show up in a change in the the
elasticities underlying (6), as well as through a change in the threshold level ¯ Tijt in equation
(7).
Our maintained hypothesis thus states that latent trade between countries i and j is
governed by the traditional gravity force, i.e., the “economic mass” measured by product of
GDP of the trade partners, YitYjt, relative to world GDP,
PN
k Ykt . For the sake of simplicity,
we resort to the base-line speciﬁcation where the trade elasticity with respect to gravity is
16equal to unity.11 Note that the number of countries, N, does not necessarily coincide with
the number of trading countries.
In addition to gravity, bilateral trade is also inﬂuenced by structural characteristics of the
two economies. We denote these by a vector of determinants Sijt, entering the multiplicative
gravity equation through some functional form Π(·), which we need not further specify for
the present purpose. In addition to the two countries’ trade policy stance, such as their
membership in regional trade agreements or the WTO and more direct measures of their trade
policies, Sijt also includes structural diﬀerences between the two countries, such their relative
factor endowments. A theoretical justiﬁcation for this is found in Helpman & Krugman
(1985, ch.8) who show that in a model with a homogeneous good and a diﬀerentiated-goods-
sector, and with Heckscher-Ohlin-driven inter-industry trade, any given volume of trade is
consistent with alternative combinations of mass-attraction (dispersion of endowment levels
across countries) and structural diﬀerences (endowment ratios) between countries. More
speciﬁcally, a lower mass-attraction from a less even country-dispersion may be compensated
by an increase in structural diﬀerence. In the above formulation, this would be captured
by the corresponding elasticity of the function Π(·). In the following general discussion, we
write these elasticities in vector form as π.
Finally, we allow trade costs C(Dij,Pt,t) to enter the gravity equation through some
functional form F(·). In turn, trade costs are determined by geographical and cultural dis-
tance, grouped together in the time-invariant vector Dij, and by prices for crucial inputs in
transportation, such as the price of oil and the rental price of transport and communications
equipment. We write these prices in vector form as Pt. The expression C (Dij,Pt,t) is in-
terpreted as a minimum cost function for overcoming the distance Dij for the sake of trade,
given relevant prices and technology prevailing at time t. We narrow our focus on geographi-
cal distance, so that Dij becomes a scalar. Moreover, we assume that the production function
for transport services is constant returns to scale and technological progress in the transport
sector is Hicks neutral and independent of distance. Writing At for the productivity level in
11See Evenett & Keller (2002) for a discussion of alternative cases where incomplete specialization leads to
ac o e ﬃcient of less than unity.
17transportation, we then have
Cijt = C (Dij,Pt,t)=DijA−1
t c(Pt), (8)
where c has the usual interpretation of a minimum unit-cost function. Substituting this
relationship into the gravity equation and taking logs, we obtain
lnT∗






+ πlnSijt + δ lnDij + δαlnPt, (9)
where δ is the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs Cij,a n dα is a vector of cost
shares for oil and equipment, as implied by the production function for transport services.
Equation (9) shows how the trade-eﬀect of technological improvements in transport and
communication might be reﬂected in estimation results. Typically, the productivity level At
will not be observable directly. Hence, one might be tempted to recover this eﬀect from the
residuals in an estimation of a gravity equation like (9), with −δ lnAt excluded and focusing
on observations where Tijt > 0, as usual in the literature. More speciﬁcally, provided that
the estimation controls for all observable determinants of bilateral trade that vary only along
t h et i m ed i m e n s i o n ,s u c ha sPt, estimates of time-varying intercepts might be equated with
−δ lnAt.12 In addition, one may wish to allow for the elasticity δ to parametrically vary
across time, as in Brun et al. (2004), and to incorporate this information when recovering At
from the time-varying intercepts. Provided δ<0, any increase in At over time would boost
bilateral trade, as expected.
However, since equation (9) relates to latent trade T∗
ijt, any procedure based on actual
observations where Tijt > 0 is questionable. We shall return to this in more detail in the
following subsection. Intuitively, against the background of the extensive margin of world
trade mentioned above, it is easy to recognize that there is an additional channel which
would escape any such procedure. In equation (7), if the term ¯ Tijt is allowed to vary along
the time dimension, it essentially captures the same information as −δ lnAt. Hence, an in-
crease in At is equivalent to a reduction in ¯ Tijt, the threshold level of latent trade, beyond
12This is the view taken, for instance, by Buch et al. (2004).
18which positive trade occurs. In other words, technological improvements in transport and
communications are also directly related to the extensive margin of international trade, which
should, therefore, be explicitly taken into account by an appropriate econometric strategy.
4.2 Econometric issues
From an econometric point of view, one might be tempted to treat movements on the exten-
sive margin of world trade as a sample selection problem. This would imply that we have a
separate theory explaining the establishment of a trading relationship between any two coun-
tries, independent on the gravity equation which explains the extent of trade, once such a
relationship exists. It is not obvious however, why the establishment of trading relationships
should be governed by “laws” fundamentally diﬀerent from those of the gravity approach. A
preferable approach is to rely on a uniﬁed gravity model to explain both, the emergence of a
trading relationship where none exists to start with (extensive margin of world trade), and
t h ee x t e n to ft r a d ew h e r ei te x i s t s( i n t e n s i v em a r g i n ) . T h i si s ,i n d e e d ,w h a tw eh a v ed o n e
above.
The corresponding statistical model is what Wooldridge (2002) calls the corner-solution
model. This is a special case of the censored regression, and it allows for a full-ﬂedged analysis
of the extensive and the intensive margin of world trade expansion within a uniﬁed gravity
approach.13 For simplicity we now use Xijt to denote the vector of all exogenous explanatory
variables (all in natural logs) in an equation like (9), although some of these (like distance)
are time-invariant. We refer to these variables, collectively, as “the gravity force”. The





σ ∼ N[0,1], (10)
where β is a vector of gravity-related parameter, and N[0,1] denotes the standard-normal
13It should perhaps be noted that one should not look at the problem as one of a mere sample defect,a s
in the usual censored regression context. Speciﬁcally, the problem is not one of erroneously coding “negative
trade” with Tij =0 , as would be the case in a censored distribution with bottom-coding at T
∗
ij =0 .I n s t e a d ,
the appropriate interpretation of the model is one where the endogenous outcome includes the possibility of a
corner solution with Tij =0 , depending on the explanatory variables.
19distribution.14 In statistical terms, the mean of latent trade lnT∗
ijt, conditional on gravity
forces Xijt,i se q u a lt oXijtβ, with variance equal to σ2. Writing the model in this way allows
a direct application of results on censored standard-normal distributions.
Since ln(0) is not deﬁned, we proceed by replacing zero-trade by Tijt =1 .A ni m m e d i a t e
consequence of this statistical model is that the conditional mean of actual trade lnTijt
c a n n o tb el i n e a ri nXijt, because there is positive probability mass at Tijt =1 ,o rlnTijt =0 .
One might try to address this problem by means of nonlinear least squares (NLS), as in
Silva and Tenreyro (2003) or Coe et al. (2002). However, this poses several problems. First,
since lnTijt includes corner outcomes, lnTijt |Xijt is probably heteroskedastic, which renders
NLS ineﬃcient.15 Using weighted NLS requires an arbitrary choice of a speciﬁcm o d e lf o r
the conditional variance, var(lnTijt |Xijt), and would thus seem questionable; see Wooldridge
(2002, p. 518 ﬀ). Secondly, and more importantly, the coeﬃcients obtained by NLS estimation
of a model for E(lnTijt |Xijt) are diﬃcult to interpret. By deﬁnition, such a model would
not allow us to estimate any feature of the distribution of lnTijt |Xijt, other than its mean.
Speciﬁcally, it does not allow us to isolate the eﬀects corresponding to the intensive and the
extensive margin of world trade. In the present context, the extensive margin is captured by
Pr[lnTijt ≥ 0|Xijt], while the intensive margin is captured by E[lnTijt |Xijt,lnTijt > 0].
For a better understanding of the results below, it is worth exploring in somewhat more
detail the relationships between the parameters β and the eﬀects that we would associate
















where z ≡ Xijtβ/σ, and a superscript r denotes a speciﬁc explanatory variable r. The term
14We shall later return to a separation between country-speciﬁc explanatory variables and year-speciﬁc
‘ﬁxed’ eﬀects (intercepts), which are meant to control in a non-parametric way for global events, such as
oil-price shocks, the global business cycle, or the eﬃciency of the transport sector, At.
15Heteroskedasticity arises because at the “corner”, i.e., where E(lnTijt |Xijt)=0 ,w eo b s e r v eo n l yo n e -
sided deviations. More generally, for values of explanatory variables leading to a lower E(lnTijt |Xijt)=0 ,
the variance of the error term is smaller.
20λ(z) is the inverse Mills ratio, λ(z)= :φ(z)/Φ(z),w i t hφ and Φ denoting the standard normal
density and the standard normal distribution function, respectively.16 Note that, given (10),
the conditional probability of positive trade, Φ(Xijtβ/σ),i sl e s st h a n1 ,w h i c hg i v e sr i s e
to attenuation.17 The reason for this is straightforward. Suppose βr > 0 and we consider
a reduction in Xr
ijt.T h e m a r g i n a l e ﬀect on the conditional mean of the uncensored latent
variable T∗
ijt must clearly be larger (in absolute value) than the eﬀect on the conditional
mean of the “cornered” variable Tijt. However, the economic interpretation of (12) in the
gravity context is not straightforward, as it is an amalgam of the intensive and the extensive
margin. It gives the marginal eﬀect of gravity forces on the expected volume of trade, allowing
for corner-solutions, but without explicitly separating corner cases (extensive margin) from
interior cases (intensive margin).
The intensive margin as such relates to the expected value of trade, conditional on the
gravity force Xijt (see Greene, 2003, p. 670):
E(lnTijt |Xijt,lnTijt > 0) = Xijtβ + σλ(z), with (13)
∂ E(lnTijt |Xijt,lnTijt > 0)
∂Xr
ijt
= βr − βrλ(z)[z + λ(z)], (14)
where λ(z) again is the inverse Mills ratio, with z ≡ Xijtβ/σ.T h e extensive margin,o n
the other hand, relates to the probability of a given country pair already having taken up a







where the marginal coeﬃcient, ∂ Pr[lnTijt ≥ 0|Xijt]/∂Xr
ijt,m a yb ed e r i v e db yd i ﬀerentiating
16See Greene (2003, p. 762-3). The ﬁrst of the two terms in (11) is the discrete part of the censored
distribution, measuring the probability mass at zero, while the second, bracketed term is the conditional
mean of the corresponding truncated normal distribution. Note that λ(y) gives the hazard function of the
standard-normal distribution.















= Φ(−Xijtβ/σ). Due to symmetry, we have Φ(−Xijtβ/σ)=1 − Φ(Xijtβ/σ). Hence,
Φ(Xijtβ/σ) is the complementary probability for Φ(−Xijtβ/σ), and thus the probability of positive trade.
21tiating the equality
E(lnTijt |Xijt)=P r( l nTijt ≥ 0|Xijt) · E(lnTijt |Xijt,lnTijt > 0), (16)
and invoking the associated marginal eﬀects; see Wooldridge (2002, p. 523). Note that the
marginal eﬀects are not constant on either of the two margins. We shall return to this when
presenting estimation results below.
It should be noted that the usual procedure of running OLS regression on the subsample






+ εijt with E(εijt |Xijt,lnTijt > 0)=0. (17)
Obviously, running OLS of lnTijt on Xijt for lnTijt > 0 amounts to omitting the variable
λ(Xijtβ/σ) in the above equation. If the covariance between Xijt and λ(Xijtβ/σ) is non-
zero, then the coeﬃcients β are inconsistently estimated. Moreover, regressing lnTijt on Xijt
using all of the data, i.e., including the observations where Tijt =1 , will not consistently
estimate β either, since E(lnTijt |Xijt) is nonlinear in Xijt, β and σ.
It is worth considering very brieﬂy the bias involved in the usual procedure by looking at
the simple univariate case, using y and x to denote the dependent and independent variable.
The model then becomes






Ignoring the second term and running a regression of y on x for all observations y>0,
introduces the aforementioned omitted-variable-bias. The estimated coeﬃcient ˆ β is




Since λ(c)=φ(c)/Φ(c) > 0 and λ0 (c)=−λ(c)[c + λ(c)] < 0, we know that cov[x,λ(βx/σ)] >
0. Moreover, we know that in a sample where no corner-solutions appear E(y|x,y > 0) =E(y|x)=
βx. Hence, since σ·cov[x,λ(βx/σ)]/var(x) > 0, we conclude that ˆ β>β . The omitted-
variable-bias causes an over-estimation of β. One may, however, argue that in the long-run
the extensive margin should disappear, as trade eventually does cover the whole world, whence
ˆ β → β with time. Accordingly, ˆ β falls towards β as time unfolds.
225E s t i m a t i o n r e s u l t s
5.1 Data
For the left-hand side trade data, we may refer to the extensive description in section 2
above. For the right-hand side variables, we use standard data sources. GDP in purchasing
power parities is taken from the Penn World Tables 6.1, and (where missing) from the World
Development indicators. Data on geographic distance is taken from the CEPII homepage.18
Data on whether a country is an island or is landlocked has been taken from the CIA fact book
(2003), which also contains information on land surface, and the fraction of land surface that
can be exploited for agricultural production. Countries’ memberships in diverse regional trade
agreements or the WTO has been taken from the websites of the respective organizations.
We also use the Sachs-Warner index, as updated by Wacziarg and Welch (2003), as a proxy
for the overall restrictiveness of a country’s trade policy.
In our regressions, we also include a multilateral resistance index. An intuitive justiﬁcation
for this is that the gravity force between any two countries not only depends on how far apart
they are from each other, but also on how far apart each of them is with respect to other
countries. A more rigorous justiﬁcation is found in Anderson & van Wincoop (2003).19 In
line with Brun et al. (2004), we deﬁne this index as Rit =
P





for all j. A similar variable is computed for country j.
Table 1 provides the mean and standard deviation of our main variables, measured at
the starting year of our panel (1950), at the ﬁnal year (1997), and over the entire time
span of the sample. We report only on observations for which none of our variables con-
tain missing values. The natural logarithm has been applied to continuous variables. We
have constructed a proxy to capture diﬀerences between two countries labor-capital ratio
by computing a structural diﬀerences index deﬁned as the squared diﬀerence between two
countries’ real GDPs per capita. This measure is meant to capture Heckscher-Ohlin type
determinants of trade ﬂows. The product of the fraction of arable land in total surface is
18See http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
19See also Feenstra (2004, ch.5), Harrigan (2004), and Anderson & van Wincoop (2004).
23meant to proxy the ease of goods transport within a country. The RTA dummy takes the
value of one if both countries are in one of the following regional trade agreements: EU,
EFTA, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, CACM (Central American Common Market), CARICOM
(Carribean Common Market), ASEAN, USIS (US—Israel free trade agreement) and AUSD
(Australian—New-Zealand free trade agreement).
Our panel is unbalanced because the number of sovereign countries (as deﬁned by the
UNO) has increased greatly since 1950. This increase has come in two major waves: in the
early sixties, a large number of formerly colonialized African and South East Asian countries
have become independent. In the mid nineties, the break-ups of some formerly communist
countries has added again to the number of dyads, N. Note that this number increases
approximately quadratically in the number of countries C since N = C (C − 1)/2. In 1950,
C =7 6so that N = 2850 while in 1997 C =1 8 1so that N = 16290. Thus, over the last
half-decade, the number of potential bilateral trading relationships has increased by more
than 570%. Unfortunately, some of the relevant explanatory variables listed in table 1 are
missing, so that our sample comprises 1,239 country pairs (out of 2,850 possible ones) in 1950
and 11,993 (out of 16,290) in 1997. On average, we have about 6,599 observations per year.
5.2 An illustration of the distance-puzzle
Before turning to a consistent estimation of the corner-solution model by means of a Tobit
approach, we want to provide a concise illustration of what has been referred to as the
distance-puzzle above. To do so, we estimate (9) with T∗
ijt = Tijt > 0,s t i c k i n gt ot h ew i d e l y
accepted method of Rose (2004) and many others, i.e., relying on pooled OLS. Our basic
model is straightforwardly found from (9), where all covariates which vary only with time are
captured by inclusion of time-varying intercepts, denoted by a vector Kt. More speciﬁcally,
these intercepts are meant to control in a non-parametric way for year-speciﬁcg l o b a le v e n t s ,
such as oil price shocks, the global business cycle, or — of special importance in our context
—t h ee ﬃciency of the transport sector. To illustrate the time dependency of the distance
coeﬃcient, we interact the year-speciﬁce ﬀects with distance:
lnTijt = δt[(lnDij)Kt]+γ ln(YitYjt)+πlnSijt + Kt + εijt, (20)
24where εijt is an error with the usual properties. The role of distance is reported through a
vector of time-varying coeﬃcients δt,a n dγ is the elasticity of joint GDP, which is now freed
from unity, while π is a vector of elasticities with respect to structural characteristics, as
noted in section 3 above. Note that with the presence of time-varying intercepts Kt,t h e r e
is no scope left to include pure time-variant variables, such as the price of petroleum or
transport equipment, and world GDP. In line with Rose (2004), we assume that observations
are independent across country-pairs (groups), but not necessarily independent within groups.
We adjust the variance-covariance matrix in order to capture within-group correlation.
One might also believe that, despite the gravity model’s impressive successl in explaining
the magnitude of bilateral trade, there are still important country-pair speciﬁc determinants
not explicitly covered by (20) above. The error term then becomes εijt = vij + uijt,a n dt h e
appropriate method of estimation is a random eﬀects model, as for instance used in Brun et
al. (2004). However, our prime interest lies in the behavior of δt over time, hence it seems
equally important to carefully control for year-speciﬁce ﬀects. Our reading of the existing
literature is that this has not always been done.
F i g u r e4s h o w st h et i m ep a t ho fδ. As in Brun et al. (2004), we observe that the (absolute
value) of the coeﬃcient has almost doubled in the time span from 1950 to 1997. The black
solid line in the ﬁgure is based on estimation of (20) by robust OLS. The dashed line represents
an estimation where unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, applying a random eﬀects
panel estimator. Finally, the grey solid line depicts the distance coeﬃcient in (20), estimated
separately for each year in the sample. Note that, unlike the two other procedures, this
allows for time-variation in γ and π. We control for a host of country-speciﬁc determinants
of bilateral trade, some of which are also time-variant. All of them are standard in the gravity
model. From ﬁgure 4, we conclude that the puzzle is robust to the obvious modiﬁcations of
the estimation technique, and that the change in δ over time is non-trivial in size.
Before turning to a brief interpretation of this result, we test for the existence of a time
trend in δ by parametrizing the time-distance interaction, whence the regression equation
becomes
lnTijt = δ0 lnDij + δ1(lnDij)t + τt+ γ ln(YitYjt)+πlnSijt + Kt + εijt. (21)
25Clearly, with the presence of a time trend τt, the matrix of time-speciﬁce ﬀects, Kt,c a p t u r e s
eﬀects that are diﬀerent from those in equation (20) above. Table 2 shows the results of
this regression. Although we use the same methodology and (almost) the same data as Rose
(2004), the vector of controls Sijt diﬀers somewhat from his, because we explicitly control for
the degree of trade friendliness of institutions, as dichotomized by the Sachs-Warner index.
Moreover, we also control for armed conﬂicts between countries, and for whether countries
are ravaged by civil wars. Note that we are at this stage still working with a sample that
does not contain zero bilateral trade observations, so that the armed conﬂicts controls turn
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The elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance over time; 1950-1997
Figure 4
Column (1) in Table 2 reproduces a standard gravity equation, such as the one found
in Rose (2004). While our sample is not exactly the same has Rose’s, the point estimates
of our regression and the overall ﬁt (adjusted R2) are very close to Rose’s.20 Note that
20We should add here that some of our additional regressors, such as the Sachs-Warner index, are not
26we suppress year-speciﬁce ﬀects in the output. Column (2) reports the result of the most
parsimonious model incorporating the time-distance interaction. The coeﬃcient δ1 is very
precisely estimated. Its absolute value grows from 0.8 in 1950 to 1.4 in 1997. Column (3)
adds additional information on geographical barriers that may impede trade between two
countries. Column (4) supplements the set of regressors by variables describing the stance of
trade policy (the Sachs-Warner index, membership in regional trade agreements, membership
in the WTO) and international relations (such as whether the countries are currently ﬁghting
aw a r ,o rs u ﬀer from a civil war).
All of these modiﬁcations do not change the time eﬀect on δ signiﬁcantly. Column (5)
takes out the year-speciﬁc intercepts and replaces them with the price of petroleum and
real world GDP. Again, this modiﬁcation has only very minor eﬀects on the signiﬁcance
and size of the estimates. Finally, column (6) moves away from pooled OLS and runs (21)
using the random eﬀects estimator. This modiﬁcation increases the distance coeﬃcient at the
beginning of the sample, but reduces the rate at which δ changes over time. At the end of the
sample, the coeﬃcient is 1.5. While the distance-puzzle in terms of the time-variation of δ
thus persists if we control for unobserved heterogeneity, the reason why the eﬀect of distance
as such is larger in this case seems obvious. One major unobserved variable, of course, is
the quality of inter-country transport infrastructure. If this variable has a positive eﬀect on
bilateral trade ﬂows but is negatively correlated with distance, then OLS under-estimates δ.
If the negative correlation between infrastructure and distance weakens over time with the
establishment of intercontinental ﬂights, improved telecommunication, etc., then the bias in
the estimated δ falls over time.
Having run a wide variety of sample sensitivity checks, trying an almost exhaustive per-
mutation of the variables at the right-hand-side of our regression, we must thus conclude that
the distance-puzzle seems very robust to changes in methodology, sample composition, or the
speciﬁcation of the gravity equation. All of this, however, holds for the case where we do
not consistently diﬀerentiate between the two margins of world trade: the extensive and the
intensive margin. Therefore, we now return to the corner-solutions model introduced above,
available for all of his observations.
27and apply it to our data using the Tobit estimation approach.
5.3 Results from estimating a corner-solutions model
In section 2 above, we have emphasized the empirical importance of the dual margin of world
trade, the extensive and the intensive margin. In section 3, we have seen that incorporating
the dual margin in a uniﬁed gravity model, called the corner-solutions model, raises statistical
problems with applying OLS or simple NLS procedures. In this section, we therefore resort
to the Tobit approach which is well established as the appropriate procedure for censored
regression problems. We present estimation results based on the above mentioned gravity
speciﬁcation, using the data set described above.
Table 3 reports the Tobit estimation results. For reference purposes we include column
(3) of table 2, reporting the results obtained using only strictly positive trade observations
and employing OLS estimation. Column (2) expands the sample to include zero trade obser-
vations. While OLS is not a consistent way to estimate the gravity equation when there is
a large mass of zero trade observations, it nevertheless serves a useful purpose as a reference
case. Clearly, including zero observations changes most coeﬃcients dramatically. This is not
surprising, given what we already know from section 2 above, and given the fact that the
sample size is now almost twice as large as before. As in Silva and Tenreyro (2003), who use
a Poisson model to estimate a non-linear gravity equation for the year 1990, the coeﬃcient
on the product of GDP is no longer close to unity. This is evidence against the canonical
form of the gravity model which implies a coeﬃcient of unity. But it is not something we
want to explore any further, since there are well-established versions of the gravity equation
which allow for a non-unitary income elasticity, as we have mentioned in section 3 above.
Also, the coeﬃcient on the product of land area turns positive, while it is negative in the
standard model.21
21There is a plausible explanation to this result: If the income elasticity of bilateral trade is close to unity,
country size as measured by GDP is irrelevant for trade. On face value, this is at odds with the stylized fact
that larger countries tend to be more closed. However, land area is positively correlated to GDP and enters
negatively in the standard regression. Thus, the results are compatible with a negative size/openness relation.
If, however, the income elasticity is below unity, as in our results, larger countries trade less. In order to
replicate the negative size/openness correlation, our model does not require a negative eﬀect of geographical
size on bilateral trade. In other words, collinearity between geographical size and GDP makes it diﬃcult to
28A more important point, however, relates to the coeﬃcient on GATT- or WTO-membership.
Rose (2004) has found it hard to conclude from the standard model that membership has
a statistically signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect, as one might perhaps expect — and the WTO
might hope. Column (2) of table 3 reveals a coeﬃcient which is quite large and strongly
positive. Turning to the distance-puzzle, we note that the total eﬀect of distance on trade is
not wildly diﬀerent in column (2) from column (1): at the end of the time window, i.e. in
1997, time t is equal to 48, and the estimated elasticity of distance is −1.45 and −1.36,r e -
spectively. Setting aside the diﬀerence in overall levels, however, once zero trade observations
are included, there is a strong positive trend in the (negative) coeﬃcient of distance. Hence,
there is some evidence already at this stage that the inhibiting force of distance has, in fact,
fallen over time.22
Notice that the only diﬀerence between columns (2) and (1) in table 3 is that (2) also
looks at the extensive margin. We know already from section 2 above that the extensive
margin of globalization is important in terms of descriptive empirical evidence. What table
3 tells us in column (2) is that including this margin in gravity estimations is also important
in terms of the distance-puzzle and with respect to WTO-membership. However, in view of
section 3 above, we should be aware of the fact that column (2) does not yet incorporate the
extensive margin in a methodologically sound way.
Results from a sound estimation, based on the Tobit approach, are found in columns (3)
through (6) of table 3. All estimates reported are marginal coeﬃcients, and a very high of
precision allows for comfortable statistical inference. First, column (3) shows the marginal
coeﬃcients of the latent linear model that underlies the Tobit model. These are obviously
diﬃcult to interpret. In columns (4) through (6), the corner-solution is appropriately taken
into account. As we know from the previous section, the model is inherently non-linear, so
that the marginal eﬀects are not constant and need to be evaluated at some sample point.
We have chosen to go the conventional way and use the means of all dependent variables to
isolate the eﬀect of either of these variables.
22One should perhaps mention that there is anecdotal, and even more formal evidence on the evolution of
distance related trade costs which is consistent with a positive trend in the distance coeﬃcient, as apparent
in column (1); see Hummels (1999). But extraneous information of this kind is inadequate to discriminate
between columns (1) and (2), since, based on section 3 above, we have strong methodological reasons to
question the validity of both column (1) and column (2).
29do this evaluation.23
What we are looking for is a direct handle on our two margins of world trade. The
intensive margin has been identiﬁed above as the marginal eﬀect on the mean of trade,
conditional on the gravity force and the existence of a trading relationship; see equation
(14) above. The estimated coeﬃcients are listed in column (4) of table 1. The extensive
margin, on the other hand, is associated with the marginal eﬀect on the probability of an
existing trading relationship, conditional on gravity forces; see equation (15) above. The
corresponding estimates are given in column (6) of table 1. The overall eﬀect on the mean
of trade, conditional on gravity alone, is given in column (5) in the middle, corresponding
to equation (12) above. Clearly, columns (3) through (6) share the same t-values, and the
signs of the coeﬃcients have to be identical. Note, however, that the decomposition (16) is
valid only for levels, and multiplying the conditional partial derivative and the probability of
observing a positive trade volume does not deliver the unconditional partial derivative.
What are the core results of a consistent Tobit estimation, vis à vis OLS in column
(2)? For the sake of time and space, we restrict ourselves to a brief focus on the role of
distance. Looking at column (4), the intensive margin, we realize that OLS over-estimates
the eﬀect of distance towards the end of the sample. For instance, for 1997 we obtain an
estimate of −1.45,c o m p a r e dt o−1.26 for the Tobit result. On the other hand, it under-
estimates the trade inhibiting force of distance in earlier periods of the sample. Thus, for
1950 we obtain a coeﬃcient of −0.78 versus −1.4. This result is broadly in line with Silva
and Tenreyro (2003), who also conclude for 1990 that the standard model overestimates
the role of distance. Moreover, the product of GDPs now (i.e., with Tobit) appears with a
very low marginal coeﬃcient, indicating that countries with large GDPs trade less compared
to countries with small GDPs, everything else equal. In absolute values, the coeﬃcients
estimated in column (4) are larger than those estimated in (2). This is true in particular for
the trade policy proxies.
Turning to the probability that a strictly positive trade ﬂow is observed between a coun-
try pair, i.e., the extensive margin, we observe from column (6) that distance plays an ever
23In computing the partial derivatives, sums of binary variables which take integer values over the interval
[0,2], are treated as continous variables.
30decreasing role. Thus, at mean distance, increasing distance by one percent lowers the prob-
ability of an existing trading relationship by 0.32 percentage points in 1950, while in 1997
this marginal eﬀect has come down to 0.28 percentage points.
6 Conclusions
We have started out by drawing attention to a twofold dimension of growth in world trade.
At any point in time, countries that already have established a trading relationship may
intensify their bilateral trade, and where a bilateral trading relationship has not yet been
established it may be taken up for the ﬁrst time. We have argued that the latter dimension
has found inadequate attention in theoretical and empirical research, particularly regarding
the so-called gravity approach which attempts to explain the volume of bilateral trading
relationships.
Our aim in this paper is to explore this “unchartered territory”. In a ﬁrst step, we have
provided systematic empirical evidence on the relative importance of the two dimensions,
which we have called the extensive and the intensive margin of world trade. Towards this end,
we have introduced a vintage-notion for a trading relationship. Using this tool in dissecting
the evolution of world trade from 1950 to 1997, we have found signiﬁcant action on both
margins, with the extensive margin still far from being fully exploited even towards the end
of the 1990s. Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence for episodes where signiﬁcantly more action took
place on the extensive than the intensive margin, and vice versa. We have taken this as
an incentive to develop a uniﬁed framework that allows us to simultaneously capture both
margins of globalization in a consistent way.
This incentive is reinforced by recent evidence from the gravity-based empirical literature,
indicating that distance as a trade-inhibiting force has gained in importance through recent
history. This runs counter to the wide-spread consensus that technological improvements in
transport and communication should have reduced the barrier-eﬀect of distance. Using an
extensive data set covering trade between 1950 and 1997, we ﬁnd that the distance-puzzle is
very robust with respect to methods and speciﬁcations for the estimated gravity equation, as
long as one adheres to the traditional approach where only country pairs with strictly positive
trade are included. In doing so, however, one looks only at the intensive margin of world
31trade, thus systematically ignoring all evidence from the extensive margin which relates to
the establishment of new trading relationships.
Going one step further, we take up the obvious question of whether including the exten-
sive margin makes a diﬀerence. Arguing that the extensive margin may be treated on an
equal footing with the intensive margin of world trade within a generalized gravity model of
bilateral trade, we develop a simple model which incorporates a rudimentary treatment of
the transport sector. Including the extensive margin of world trade proves diﬃcult, however,
due to econometric problems associated with censored regression. We provide a comprehen-
sive discussion of these issues, framed in the so-called corner-solutions model of world trade,
whereby zero trade is an endogenous outcome of the trade-generating and trade-inhibiting
forces at work. Writing down a statistical model for the corner-solutions gravity equation,
the extensive and intensive margins of world trade appear as well deﬁned marginal eﬀects on
the conditional mean of bilateral trade. Moreover, the model clearly points to the possibil-
ity of biased estimates in conventional, “intensive-margin-only” models. In other words, the
model questions the use of traditional estimation techniques for a gravity equation explaining
bilateral trade.
As a ﬁnal step, we therefore provide estimates obtained relying on the Tobit approach
towards consistent estimation of such a corner-solutions version of the gravity model, again
using our extensive data set covering world trade between 1950 and 1997. Comparing our
results with those of the existing literature, we ﬁnd that the distance-puzzle does indeed
disappear. We also ﬁnd that GATT- or WTO-membership comes out more supportive of
trade, than was recently concluded from gravity-type empirical studies.
There are various ways in which the results found here may be improved upon. First,
distance-related trade costs are likely to be non-linear in distance. More speciﬁcally, it seems
questionable that the oft-quoted technological improvements in transport and communica-
tion, an alleged driving force of globalization, have been equally relevant for long-distance
and short-distance trade. Similarly, improvements may have been diﬀerently pronounced for
land and sea transport. Obviously, an improved explicit treatment of the transport sector,
or — more generally — of trade costs, is required to fully address these points. Moreover,
distance-related trade costs are likely to be of diﬀering importance across goods or indus-
tries. This points to the need for a less stepmotherly treatment of transport and trade costs
32in structural models of trade, as recently proposed by Deardorﬀ (2004).
Meanwhile, the results reported here should reinforce the widespread notion that the
post-World-War-II era is, indeed, characterized by a long-run decline in the trade inhibiting
force of geographic distance. However, our view of the distance-puzzle is that, even if resolved
in the strict sense of the word, it serves as a “warning shot” against exaggerated views of a
dramatically “shrinking world geography”. Our results do not warrant the conclusion that
distance and trade costs have become negligibly small. The world has not yet become a
“global village”, and it probably never will. Indeed, a further important conclusion of our
study is that world trade, even after 5 decades of spectacular growth, is still far away from
covering the whole world. The extensive margin of trade, where dormant bilateral trading
relationships become utilized, still leaves much ground to be covered, and much gains from




Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ln of bilateral trade (in real US$) 5.77 4.20 3.03 3.51 3.36 3.80
Ln of distance (in km) 8.43 0.93 8.45 0.82 8.47 0.82
#0,1,2: sum landlocked 0.19 0.41 0.41 0.57 0.33 0.53
Ln product of land surface (in sqkm) 25.50 2.19 23.29 3.40 23.94 3.20
Ln product of arable surface (in sqkm) 4.80 1.31 4.26 1.81 4.20 1.79
Ln product of real GDPs (in PPP) 47.61 2.00 47.95 2.71 47.58 2.60
Ln structural diﬀerence 14.47 2.79 16.72 2.59 15.99 2.76
Ln multilat. resist. index, country i 0.60 0.15 0.34 0.27 0.40 0.26
Ln multilat. resist. index, country j 2.00 1.17 1.80 1.42 2.05 1.25
Both countries in same RTA 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.50 0.40 0.49
#0,1,2: sum Sachs-Warner index 0.24 0.45 1.24 0.69 0.64 0.69
#0,1,2: sum GATT/WTO membership 0.88 0.69 1.60 0.57 1.26 0.69
Number of observations 1239 11993 6599
Number of strictly positive observations 857 6513 3516Table 2
Regression results: The distance puzzle in linear speciﬁcations
Dependent variable: ln of real bilateral trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS RE RE
Ln of distance -0.7951 -0.7958 -0.7813 -0.7786 -1.0349 -1.0279
(0.0371) (0.0372) (0.0383) (0.0385) (0.0234) (0.0238)
Distance time -0.0115 -0.0115 -0.0139 -0.0139 -0.0071 -0.0071
interaction (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Time 0.0191 0.0103 0.0119 0.0103 -0.0091 -0.0646
(0.0079) (0.0098) (0.0079) (0.0099) (0.0025) (0.0033)
Ln of product of 0.8176 0.8178 0.9574 0.9555 0.7724 0.7778
real GDPs (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0055) (0.0056)
Ln mult. resist. (ct. i) 1.3839 1.3683 0.5037 0.4786 1.0377 0.8991
(0.0755) (0.0754) (0.0744) (0.0741) (0.0641) (0.0650)
Ln mult. resist. (ct. j) -0.1604 -0.1634 -0.0691 -0.0720 -0.0854 -0.0971
(0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0126) (0.0128)
Ln of real price of -0.0534 0.0259 -0.0004
crude oil (0.0145) (0.0151) (0.0070)
Ln of real world gdp 0.0843 -0.0613 1.0448
(0.1292) (0.1256) (0.0498)
#0,1,2: sum island 0.1780 0.1751 0.0994 0.0754
(0.0416) (0.0415) (0.0362) (0.0367)
#0,1,2: sum landlocked -0.1742 -0.1716 -0.3699 -0.3478
(0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0307) (0.0312)
Ln product of land -0.1656 -0.1640 -0.1011 -0.1057
surface (in sqkm.) (0.0094) (0.0093) (0.0069) (0.0070)
Ln product of arable -0.2277 -0.2272 -0.0794 -0.0850
land surface (in sqkm.) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0101) (0.0102)
Ln structural diﬀerence -0.0098 -0.0090 -0.0013 -0.0006
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Both countries member 0.1279 0.1306 0.0161 0.0531
of same RTA (0.0344) (0.0334) (0.0120) (0.0115)
#0,1,2: Sachs-Warner 0.5054 0.5228 0.1831 0.2308
open countries (0.0239) (0.0232) (0.0074) (0.0072)
#0,1,2: sum 0.0340 0.0352 0.0429 0.0547
GATT/WTO members (0.0252) (0.0251) (0.0083) (0.0083)
Year speciﬁc eﬀects (Kt) yes no yes no yes no
Observations 168747 168747 168747 168747 168747 168747
R-squared 0.65 0.64 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.69
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses. Year-speciﬁc intercepts and
constants are not reported. RE means random eﬀects estimator. In columns (5) and (6) the R-squared
refers to ’between’ R-squared.Table 3
Regression results: The corner solutions model
Dependent variable: ln of real bilateral trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT
E(T|X,T > 0) E(T|X) E(T∗|X) E(T|X,T > 0) E(T|X) P(T > 0|X)
Ln of distance -0.7814 -2.3455 -3.0621 -1.4428 -2.0563 -0.3223
(0.0383) (0.0521) (0.0810) (0.0382) (0.0544) (0.0085)
Distance time -0.0139 0.0205 0.0078 0.0037 0.0052 0.0008
interaction (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0002)
Time 0.0119 -0.2463 -0.1688 -0.0795 -0.1134 -0.0178
(0.0079) (0.0108) (0.0161) (0.0076) (0.0108) (0.0017)
#0,1,2: sum island 0.1781 0.5484 0.8143 0.3837 0.5468 0.0857
(0.0416) (0.0468) (0.0753) (0.0355) (0.0506) (0.0079)
#0,1,2: sum landlocked -0.1743 -0.6490 -1.1999 -0.5654 -0.8058 -0.1263
(0.0328) (0.0351) (0.0655) (0.0309) (0.0440) (0.0069)
Ln product of land -0.1656 0.2092 0.4819 0.2271 0.3236 0.0507
surface (in sqkm.) (0.0094) (0.0086) (0.0161) (0.0076) (0.0108) (0.0017)
Ln product of arable -0.2277 0.1899 0.3772 0.1777 0.2533 0.0397
land surface (in sqkm.) (0.0126) (0.0119) (0.0230) (0.0108) (0.0154) (0.0024)
Ln of product of 0.9575 0.4304 0.4938 0.2327 0.3316 0.0520
real GDPs (0.0102) (0.0084) (0.0157) (0.0074) (0.0105) (0.0017)
Ln structural diﬀerence -0.0098 -0.0596 -0.0532 -0.0251 -0.0357 -0.0056
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0041) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0004)
Ln mult. resist. (ct. i) 0.5034 2.5168 4.2432 1.9994 2.8495 0.4466
(0.0744) (0.0853) (0.1471) (0.0693) (0.0998) (0.0155)
Ln mult. resist. (ct. j) -0.0690 -0.0236 -0.0956 -0.0451 -0.0642 -0.0101
(0.0156) (0.0145) (0.0271) (0.0128) (0.0182) (0.0029)
Both countries member 0.1279 0.9432 1.4809 0.7167 1.0165 0.1517
of same RTA (0.0344) (0.0409) (0.0645) (0.0312) (0.0443) (0.0066)
#0,1,2: Sachs-Warner 0.5052 1.2536 1.9673 0.9270 1.3211 0.2071
open countries (0.0239) (0.0283) (0.0466) (0.0220) (0.0313) (0.0049)
#0,1,2: sum 0.0341 0.2667 0.6872 0.3238 0.4615 0.0723
GATT/WTO members (0.0252) (0.0270) (0.0465) (0.0219) (0.0312) (0.0049)
Both countries opposed -0.7324 0.6779 -0.3602 -0.1648 -0.2350 -0.0387
in an interstate conﬂict (0.7380) (0.6054) (0.8109) (0.3710) (0.5290) (0.0871)
Observations 168747 316744 316744 316744 316744 316744
R-squared 0.6900 0.6200
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses. Year speciﬁc intercepts and constants
are not reported. Marginal eﬀects are evaluated at sample means.References
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